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ABSTRACT
All elements in the financial statements were responsibility of the management, however
investors more pay attention on profit information so that this will trigger the manage-
ment to do earnings management. This study was intended to analyze the effect of mana-
gerial ownership, institutional ownership, independent board of commissioners, audit
committee, and the audit quality toward the earnings management. This study is using
data 35 manufacturing companies listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange 2013-2015, deter-
mination of samples in this study using purposive sampling method. The data of the
managerial ownership, institutional ownership, independent board of commissioners,
audit committee and audit quality were gathered from the company’s annual report.
Hypotheses testing using multiple regression analysis. The outcome of the hypotheses
testing shows that the managerial ownership, institutional ownership, audit committee
and audit quality will give a significant negative effect on earnings management while
the independent board of commissioners has no effect on earnings management.
ABSTRAK
Semua elemen dalam laporan keuangan merupakan tanggung jawab manajemen, namun investor
lebih memperhatikan informasi laba sehingga hal ini akan memicu manajemen untuk melakukan
manajemen laba. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis pengaruh kepemilikan manajerial,
kepemilikan institusional, dewan komisaris independen, komite audit, dan kualitas audit terhadap
manajemen laba. Penelitian ini menggunakan data 35 perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di
Bursa Efek Indonesia 2013-2015, penentuan sampel dalam penelitian ini menggunakan metode
purposive sampling. Data kepemilikan manajerial, kepemilikan institusional, dewan independen,
komite audit dan kualitas audit dikumpulkan dari laporan tahunan perusahaan. Uji hipotesis
menggunakan analisis regresi berganda. Hasil pengujian hipotesis menunjukkan bahwa
kepemilikan manajerial, kepemilikan institusional, komite audit dan kualitas audit akan
memberikan pengaruh negatif yang signifikan terhadap manajemen laba sedangkan dewan
komisaris independen tidak berpengaruh terhadap manajemen laba.
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The financial report is media for presenting a sum-
mary of all the financial information in a company
that will be communicated to the interested users
either internal or external user manual. All ele-
ments in the financial statements are the responsi-
bility of management, but the attention of inves-
tors is more often focused on the earnings infor-
mation so that this is what triggers the earnings
management by management. According to
Agustia (2013) the tendency of external parties to
pay more attention to earnings information as a
parameter of company performance, will encour-
age management to manipulate in showing earn-
ings information, called earnings management.
According to agency theory, the separation
between owner and manager can cause agency
problems. The problem occurs because of misalign-
ment or difference in interest because there is no
convergence between the maximum utility com-
pany or principal with the manager or the agent is
commonly called agency problems (Kusumaning-
tyas, 2012). With the agency problem, the activity
of making the financial report becomes irrelevant
to the needs of the company owner.
Agency theory illustrates that earnings man-
agement practices can be minimized with the su-
pervision of the internal through good corporate
governance (Fanani, 2014). Management profit can
be minimized through a monitoring mechanism to
reconcile the differences between the interests of
owners with management by: (1) enlarge owner-
ship by management; (2) the existence of an insti-
tutional stock ownership; (3) through the oversight
role of monitoring by independent directors; and
(4) establish an audit committee as the company’s
supervisor.
To increase managerial ownership can be
done by providing stock-based compensation to
the manager. Management that has a high percent-
age of share ownership will act as someone who
holds interest in the company so that it will sup-
press the happening of earnings management by
management (Mahariana & Ramantha, 2014).
According to Wahidawati (2001), institu-
tional ownership can be defined as the proportion
of shares in circulation held by other institutions
outside the company at the end of the year as
measured in percentage. Institutional ownership
is supposedly capable of providing a supervisory
mechanism within the company. The greater the
institutional ownership in the company, the lower
the tendency of managers perform earnings man-
agement activity for their function better supervi-
sion of the expert investors. Institutional owner-
ship can reduce the tendency to utilize discretion-
ary management in the financial statements so as
to provide the quality of reported earnings.
To create good corporate governance, ev-
ery company is required to have an independent
commissioner (Utami & Rahmawati, 2008). Pope,
Peasnell, & Young (1998) explains through the role
of the board in performing the supervisory func-
tion of the company’s operations by the manage-
ment, the composition (proportion) of the board
of commissioners can make an effective contribu-
tion to the results of the process of preparing the
qualified financial statements or the possibility of
avoidance of fraudulent financial statements. The
greater the proportion of independent commis-
sioners, the less earnings management, which
means that the independent commissioner nega-
tive effects on earnings management (Nasution &
Setiawan, 2007).
To gain the trust of the users of the financial
statements, it is desirable that the quality of the
audit is good (Luhgiatno, 2010). High-quality au-
diting can act as a deterrent to effective earnings
management practices because financial statements
reflect the reputation of management. If the audit
result is not qualified then the reputation of man-
agement will be destroyed. The results of the au-
dit conducted by the Big Four accounting firm and
non-Big Four can effect the audit qualitys pro-
duced. Auditors working in the big four account-
ing public firms are considered to be of higher
quality as they are equipped with a series of train-
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ing and procedures and have audit programs
deemed to be more accurate and effective than
auditors from the non-Big Four accounting public
firms (Guna & Herawati, 2010).
Research on earnings management has been
done in Indonesia some are Nasution & Setiawan
(2007), Guna & Herawati (2010), Kusumawardhani
(2012), Christiani & Yeterina (2014), Fanani (2014),
and Mahariana & Ramantha (2014), but the results
of these studies indicate inconsistency. The pur-
pose of this study was to test back by combining
several indicators of earnings management as
managerial ownership, institutional ownership,
independent board of commissioners, audit com-
mittee, and audit quality. Thus, it is hoped that
the results will be obtained that can reference and
strengthen the results of previous research.
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Managerial Ownership and Earnings
Management
Profit that is less qualified can happen be-
cause in running a business company, management
is not the owner of the company. This separation
of ownership can lead to conflicts in the manage-
ment that cause managers to act inappropriately
with the wishes of the owners. Conflicts resulting
from this separation of ownership are called agency
conflicts (Kusumawardhani, 2012). How to over-
come the agency problem is to increase manage-
rial ownership. To increase managerial ownership
can be done in a way to provide stock-based com-
pensation to the manager. Management that has a
high percentage of share ownership will act as
someone who holds interest in the company so
that it will suppress the happening of earnings
management by management (Mahariana &
Ramantha, 2014). Based on the description, first
hypotheses of this research is:
H1: managerial ownership has negative effects
on earnings management
Institutional Ownership and Earnings
management
According to Wahidawati (2001), institu-
tional ownership can be defined as the proportion
of outstanding shares owned by other institutions
outside the company, such as banks, insurance
companies, investment companies, pension funds,
and others at the end of the year as measured in
percentages. Institutional ownership is supposedly
capable of providing a supervisory mechanism
within the company. The greater the institution-
ally ownership in the company, the lower the ten-
dency of managers perform earnings management
activity for their function better supervision of the
expert investors. Institutional ownership can re-
duce the tendency to utilize discretionary man-
agement in the financial statements so as to pro-
vide the quality of reported earnings. Based on the
description, second hypotheses of this research is:
H2: institutional ownership has negative effects
on earnings management
Independent Board of Commissioners and
Earnings Management
To create good corporate governance, ev-
ery company is required to have an independent
commissioner (Utami & Rahmawati, 2008). Pope
et al. in Andayani (2010) explains through the role
of the board in performing the supervisory func-
tion of the company’s operations by the manage-
ment, the composition (proportion) of the board
of commissioners can make an effective contribu-
tion to the results of the process of preparing the
qualified financial statements or the possibility of
escaping fraudulent reports finance. The greater
the proportion of independent board of commis-
sioners, the less earnings management, which
means that the independent board of commis-
sioner negative effects on earnings management
(Nasution & Setiawan, 2007). Based on the descrip-
tion, third hypotheses of this research is:
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H3: the independent board of commissioners has
negative effects on earnings management
Audit Committee and Earnings Management
Audit committee is considered as a liaison
between shareholders and the independent board
of commissioners with the management in han-
dling control issues. The audit committee is a com-
mittee established by the independent board of
commissioners to carry out the task of supervis-
ing the management of the company (Nasution &
Setiawan, 2007). The existence of audit commit-
tees is useful to ensure transparency, disclosure
of financial statements, and equity for all stake-
holders so that the existence of the audit commit-
tee is very important for the management of the
company because it can reduce the occurrence of
earnings management. Based on the description,
fourth hypotheses of this research is:
H4: the audit committee has negative effects on
earnings management
Audit Quality and Earnings Management
To gain the trust of the users of the finan-
cial statements, it is desirable that the quality of
the audit is good (Luhgiatno, 2010). High-quality
auditing can act as a deterrent to effective earn-
ings management practices because financial state-
ments reflect the reputation of management. If the
audit result is not qualified then the reputation of
management will be destroyed. The results of the
audit conducted by the Big Four accounting firm
and non-Big Four can effect the audit quality pro-
duced. Auditors working in the Big Four of pub-
lic accounting firm are considered to be of higher
quality as they are equipped with a series of train-
ing and procedures and have audit programs
deemed to be more accurate and effective than
auditors from the non-Big Four of public account-
ing firm (Guna & Herawati, 2010). Based on the
description, fifth hypotheses of this research is:
H5: audit quality has negative effects on earn-
ings management
METHOD
The population in this research is manufac-
turing companies listed in Indonesia Stock Ex-
change in 2013-2015. With certain criteria, selected
35 companies that are used as the final sample in
this study as illustrated in Table 1. These criteria
are: (1) manufacturing company in IDX which pub-
lish financial statements as complete and consis-
tent from year 2013-2015; and (2) manufacturing
companies that have data managerial ownership,
institutional ownership consistently complete in
2013-2015.
In this research the data used is secondary
data. Secondary data needed in this study is the
company’s financial statements. Secondary data in
this study were obtained from the website of In-
donesia Stock Exchange is www.idx.co.id. Opera-
tional definition and measurement of research
variables are presented in Table 2.
Information Number of Companies 
Manufacturing company in Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) which publishes complete 
and consistent financial report 
146 
Manufacturing companies that do not have data managerial ownership, institutional 
ownership consistently complete 
(112) 
Sample Research 35 
Table 1. Summary of Determination of Number of Samples
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RESULTS
Descriptive statistics are used to know the
description of research data that is minimum, maxi-
mum, mean, and standard deviation. The results
of descriptive statistical analysis are presented in
Table 3.
Based on Table 3, it can be explained that
the mean value earnings management equal to
13.685, a minimum value of 9.963, the maximum
value of 18.190, and a standard deviation of 1.571
to the number of observations (n) of 105. The mean
value of the independent board of commissioners
approaches the standard deviation of 0.091, thus
the deviation of earnings management data is quite
high.
Then for mean value managerial ownership
of 4.056, a minimum value of 0.00001, 180.300 its
maximum value, and a standard deviation of
24.916 by the number of observation (n) of 105.
The mean value of the managerial ownership ap-
proaches the standard deviation of 24.916, thus
the deviation of managerial ownership data is quite
high.
The mean value institutional ownership of
15.860, a minimum value of 0.00001, 693.7000 its
maximum value, and a standard deviation of
96.446 by the number of observations (n) of 105.
The mean value of the institutional ownership ap-
proaches the standard deviation of 96.446, thus
the deviation of institutional ownership data is
high.
The mean value independent board of com-
missioner of 0.364, a minimum value of 0.200, the
maximum value of 0.7500, and a standard devia-
tion of 0.091 with a number of observations (n) of
105. The mean value of the independent board of
Variables Understanding Measurement 
Earnings 
Management 
Discretionary accrual using Modified Jones Model. TACit= Nit – CFOit 
 
Managerial 
Ownership  
Stock owned by the management personally and 
shares held by the subsidiary company concerned and 
its affiliates 
Percentage number of shares owned 
by the management of the entire 
outstanding share capital of the 
company 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Ownership shares by institutions The number of shares held by 
institutional investors is compared to 
total stock 
Independent Board 
of Commissioners 
 
The number of independent commissioners shall 
represent at least 30% of the total Commissioners in 
the Board of Commissioners (BAPEPAM-LK 
Regulation No. IX.I.5) 
Percentage of independent directors 
compared to the total number of 
commissioners 
Audit Committee Ownership of the Audit Committee A score of 1 and 0 
Audit Quality The Big Four Accountant's Office A score of 1 and 0 
Table 2. Definition of Operational and Measurement Variable
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean  SD 
Earnings management  9.963 18.190 13.685 1.571 
Managerial Ownership 0.00001 180.300 4.056 24.916 
Institutional Ownership 0.00001 693.700 15.860 96.446 
Independent Board of Commissioner  0.200 0.750 0.364 0.091 
Audit Committee 0 1 0.970 0.167 
Audit Quality 0 1 0.340 0.477 
Table 3. Results Descriptive Statistics Variable Research
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commissioners approaches the standard deviation
of 0.091, thus the deviation of independent board
of commissioner data is low.
The mean value of the audit committee of
0.97, the minimum value is 0, the maximum value
of 1, and standard deviation of 0.167 with the to-
tal number of observations (n) of 105. The mean
value of the audit committee approaches the stan-
dard deviation of 0.167, thus the deviation of au-
dit committee data is low.
The mean value of the audit quality of 0.34,
the minimum value is 0, the maximum value of 1,
and standard deviation of 0.477 with the total
number of observations (n) of 105. The mean value
of audit quality approaches the standard devia-
tion of 0.477, thus the deviation of audit quality
data is low.
The results of classical assumptions in Table
4 shows that this research has been free from the
problem of normality (0.706 > 0.05), multi-
collinearity (VIF five variables <10), heteroscedas-
ticity (fifth variable probability value >0.05), and
autocorrelation (value dL= 1.571 and dU= 1.780
so that 4-dU= 4-1.780= 2.220, and 4-dL= 4-1.571=
2.429. So 1.780 < 1.785 < 2.220). So the test model
has been free from the problem of testing the clas-
sical assumption.
The results of multiple linear regression in
Table 5 show that managerial ownership has a
negative and significant effect on earnings man-
agement, with a significance value of 0.046 which
is less than 0.005. This means, if the managerial
ownership increases, then the earnings manage-
ment will decrease.
Normality Variables 
Multicolinearity 
Heteroscedasticity Autocorrelation (Durbin-Watson) Critical 
Value 
VIF 
0.706 Managerial Ownership 10 3.625 0.938 1.785 
Institutional Ownership 10 3.033 0.992 
Independent Board of 
Commissioners 
10 1.147 0.061 
Audit Committee 10 1.248 0.152 
Audit Quality 10 1.109 0.995 
Table 4. The Testing of Classical Assumption
Variables Regression Coefficient 
Standard 
Error t-statistics Sig. 
Constants 10,453 1,054 9,915 0,000 
Managerial Ownership -0.210 0.108 -1.942 0.046 
Institutional Ownership -0.057 0.028 -2.033 0.045 
Independent Board of Commissioners -1.545 1.701 -0.908 0.366 
Audit Committee -2.398 0.971 -2.471 0.015 
Audit Quality -0.848 0.321 -2.639 0.010 
R2: 0.152 
Adj. R2: 0.109 
F-statistical: 3.538. Sig = 0.000. 
DW-statistical: 1.785 
n: 105 
Table 5. The Testing of Multiple Regression Analysis
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The results of multiple linear regression
shows that institutional ownership has a negative
and significant effect on earnings management,
with a significance value of 0.045 which is less than
0.05. This means, if the institutional ownership
increases, then the earnings management will de-
crease.
The results of multiple linear regression re-
lating to the independent board of commissioners
has no significant effect on earnings management,
which is indicated by a significance value of 0.366
which is greater than 0.05. This means, if the inde-
pendent board of commissioners increases, then
the earnings management will remain or constant.
The results of multiple linear regression
shows that the audit committee has a negative and
significant effect on earnings management, with a
significance value of 0.015 which is less than 0.05.
This means, if the audit committee increases, then
the earnings management will decrease.
The results of multiple linear regression
shows that the audit quality has a negative and
significant effect on earnings management with a
significance value of 0.010 which is less than 0.05.
This means that, if the audit quality increases, then
the earnings management will decrease.
DISCUSSION
The Effect of Managerial Ownership on
Earnings Management
Managerial ownership has a negative and
significant effect on earnings management. These
results are consistent with the findings of research
Mahariana & Ramantha (2014) and Fanani (2014)
who also found a negative effect of managerial
ownership on earnings management.
Profit that is less qualified can happen be-
cause in running a business company, management
is not the owner of the company. This separation
of ownership can lead to conflicts in the company
management that cause managers to act inappro-
priately with the wishes of the owners. Conflicts
resulting from this separation of ownership are
called agency conflicts. Imagery of interests be-
tween owners and management occurs when two
parties want to maximize their own wealth
(Kusumawardhani, 2012). Some of the mechanisms
that can be used to overcome such agency prob-
lems are by increasing managerial ownership
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). To improve the mana-
gerial ownership can be done in a way to give
stock-based compensation (stock-based compen-
sation) to the manager. Stock-based compensation
to managers results in an increase in managerial
ownership. The management that has a high per-
centage of share ownership will act as someone
who holds an interest in the company. Thus, it is
likely that the level of managerial ownership will
be in the same direction to suppress earnings man-
agement by management (Mahariana & Ramantha,
2014). With so expected managers will act in ac-
cordance with the wishes of the principal as a
manager will be motivated to improve his perfor-
mance.
The Effect of Institutional Ownership on
Earnings Management
Institutional ownership has a negative and
significant effect on earnings management. Insti-
tutional ownership is supposedly capable of pro-
viding a supervisory mechanism within the com-
pany. The greater the institutional ownership in
the company, the lower the tendency of managers
perform earnings management activity for their
supervisory function better than investors who
sophisticated (sophisticated investors). The results
of this study support of research conducted by
Fanani (2014).
According Kusumawardhani (2012), institu-
tional ownership has the ability to control the
management through an effective monitoring pro-
cess so as to reduce earnings management. The
percentage of certain shares owned by the institu-
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tion can effect the process of preparing financial
statements that do not rule out the existence of
accrualization according to the interests of the
management. Institutional ownership can reduce
the tendency to utilize discretionary management
in the financial statements so as to provide the
quality of reported earnings.
The Effect of Independent Board of
Commissioners on Earnings Management
The independent board of commissioners has
no significant effect on earnings management. Simi-
lar results were found by Guna & Herawati (2010)
which also shows that the existence of indepen-
dent commissioners within the company failed to
become one of the good corporate governance
mechanisms in detecting earnings management.
According to Agustia (2013) the size of the
independent board of commissioners is not a ma-
jor determinant of the effectiveness of oversight
of corporate management. However, the effective-
ness of the control mechanism depends on the
values, norms, and beliefs received in an organi-
zation and the role of independent board of com-
missioners in the monitoring activities of manage-
ment.
The active role of the independent board of
commissioners in practice is highly dependent on
the environment created by the company
FRQFHUQHG¬,QVRPHFDVHVLWLVJRRGWKDWWKHLQGH
pendent board of commissioners play a relatively
passive role, but in Indonesia it is often the case
that members of the independent board of com-
missioners do not even exercise their fundamen-
tal supervisory role towards the board of
GLUHFWRUV¬7KHLQGHSHQGHQWERDUGRIFRPPLVVLRQ
HUV LV RIWHQ FRQVLGHUHG WR KDYHQR EHQHILWV¬7KLV
can be seen in the fact, that many members of the
independent board of commissioners do not have
the ability and cannot demonstrate its inde-
SHQGHQFH¬6R WKDW LQPDQ\FDVHV WKHERDUG DOVR
failed to represent the interests of other stakehold-
ers than the interests of the majority shareholder
)&*,¬
The ownership of a centralized share in one
group or one family may be one of the reasons for
the weakness of the independent board of com-
missioners position, since the appointment of the
members of the independent board of commis-
sioners is given as a sense of respect only or based
on family relations or close acquaintance. In Indo-
nesia, a former government official or an active
member is usually appointed as a member of the
independent board of commissioners of a com-
pany in order to have access to the relevant gov-
ernment agency. In this case, the integrity and ca-
pacity of the independent board of commission-
ers often becomes less important. In turn, the in-
dependence of the board of commissioners to be
very doubtful because of his special relationship
with the majority shareholder or his relationship
with the board of directors along with a lack of
integrity and the ability of the independent board
of commissioners (FCGI, 2000).
The Effect of Audit Committee on Earnings
Management
Audit Committee has a negative and signifi-
cant effect on earnings management. The results
in accordance with the research by Nasution &
Setiawan (2007) which states that the audit com-
mittee has a negative effect on earnings manage-
ment. The audit committee is a committee estab-
lished by the board of commissioners to carry out
the task of supervising the management of the
company (Nasution & Setiawan, 2007). The exist-
ence of audit committees is useful to ensure trans-
parency, disclosure of financial statements, and
equity for all stakeholders. Audit committee is a
new component in the company’s control system.
In addition, the audit committee is considered as
a liaison between shareholders and the board of
commissioners with the management in handling
control issues. Therefore, the existence of the au-
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dit committee is very important for the manage-
ment of the company and can reduce the level of
earnings management.
The Effect of Audit Quality on Earnings
Management
Audit quality has a negative and significant
effect on earnings management. The results are
consistent with the research by Guna & Herawati
(2010) which states that audit quality experience
been influenced to earnings management. To gain
the trust of the users of the financial statements, it
is desirable that the quality of the audit is good
(Luhgiatno, 2010). Christiani & Yeterina (2014)
states that high-quality auditing acts as an effec-
tive deterrent earnings management because man-
agement reputation will be destroyed and the
company’s value will drop if this false reporting
detected and exposed. Ratmono (2010) states that
qualified auditors are able to detect earnings man-
agement actions undertaken by the client.
Christiani & Yeterina (2014) describes the
audit service is a monitoring tool against the pos-
sibility of a conflict of interest between owners
and managers as well as between the sharehold-
ers by the number of different ownership. Audit
services can reduce the information asymmetry
between managers and stakeholders of the com-
pany by allowing outsiders to check the validity
of the financial statements. The results of the au-
dit conducted by the Big Four accounting firm and
non-Big Four effects the audit qualitys produced.
Auditors working in KAP Big Four are considered
higher quality because the auditor is provided by
a series of training and auditing procedures and
programs that are considered more accurate and
effective than the auditors of the KAP non-Big Four
(Guna & Herawati, 2010).
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS
Conclusion
Based on the results of the previous analy-
sis and discussion, it can be concluded that mana-
gerial ownership, institutional ownership, audit
committee, and audit quality proved to have a sig-
nificant effect on earnings management, while the
independent board of commissioners had no sig-
nificant effect on earnings management. This shows
the weakness of the role and presence of indepen-
dent board of commissioners as executive over-
sight functions at manufacturing companies in In-
donesia. So, the presence of independent direc-
tors in the company failing to become one of the
mechanisms of good corporate governance in de-
tecting earnings management. As an implication
of the results of this study the investors are re-
quired to better know the quality of the indepen-
dent board of commissioners of companies where
they invest their shares.
Suggestions
Earnings management can reflect the higher
the weakness or ability of the company in the
market competition, so it is expected the company
make a positive issue, improvement of company
management, which makes investors interested in
investing in order to increase capital and ultimately
implicate the decline in earnings management ac-
tion.
Managerial ownership, institutional owner-
ship, independent board of commissioners, audit
committee, and audit quality need to be noticed
by the company, as this aspect in addition to pro-
viding a great appeal to investors who will invest
funds in the company.
For investors, earnings management can
serve as the basis for investment decision making
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because this aspect measures the company’s abil-
ity to generate profit levels of the investments
made to the company.
For further research can use or add other
external factors outside the model such as the level
of leverage and the change of auditor as an inde-
pendent variable that can effect earnings manage-
ment.
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